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Abstract
We investigate the efficiency of fair allocations of
indivisible goods using the well-studied price of
fairness concept. Previous work has focused on
classical fairness notions such as envy-freeness,
proportionality, and equitability. However, these
notions cannot always be satisfied for indivisible
goods, leading to certain instances being ignored
in the analysis. In this paper, we focus instead on
notions with guaranteed existence, including envy-
freeness up to one good (EF1), balancedness, max-
imum Nash welfare (MNW), and leximin. We
mostly provide tight or asymptotically tight bounds
on the worst-case efficiency loss for allocations sat-
isfying these notions.
1 Introduction
The allocation of scarce resources among interested agents
is a problem that arises frequently and plays a major role
in our society. We often want to ensure that the allo-
cation that we select is fair to the agents—the literature
of fair division, which dates back to the design of cake-
cutting algorithms over half a century ago [Steinhaus, 1948;
Dubins and Spanier, 1961], provides several ways of defining
what fair means. An issue orthogonal to fairness is efficiency,
or social welfare, which refers to the total happiness of the
agents. A fundamental question is therefore how much effi-
ciency we might lose if we want our allocation to be fair.
This question was first addressed by Caragiannis et al.
[2012], who introduced the price of fairness concept to cap-
ture the efficiency loss due to fairness constraints. For any
fairness notion and any given resource allocation instance
with additive valuations, they defined the price of fairness
of the instance to be the ratio between the maximum social
welfare over all allocations and the maximum social welfare
over allocations that are fair according to the notion. The
overall price of fairness for this notion is then defined as the
largest price of fairness across all instances. Caragiannis et
al. considered the classical fairness notions of envy-freeness,
proportionality and equitability, and presented a series of re-
sults on the price of fairness with respect to these notions.
As an example, they showed that for the allocation of indi-
visible goods among n agents, the price of proportionality is
n − 1 + 1/n, meaning that the efficiency of the best propor-
tional allocation can be a linear factor away from that of the
best allocation overall.
Caragiannis et al.’s work sheds light on the trade-off be-
tween efficiency and fairness in the allocation of both divis-
ible and indivisible resources. However, a significant limita-
tion of their study is that while an allocation satisfying each
of the three fairness notions always exists when goods are di-
visible, this is not the case for indivisible goods. Indeed, none
of the notions can be satisfied in the simple instance with at
least two agents and a single good to be allocated. Caragian-
nis et al. circumvented this issue by ignoring instances in
which the fairness notion in question cannot be satisfied. As
a result, their price of fairness analysis, which is meant to
capture the worst-case efficiency loss, fails to cover certain
scenarios that may arise in practice.1 In addition, the fact that
certain instances are not taken into account in the price of fair-
ness have seemingly contradictory consequences. For exam-
ple, since envy-free allocations are always proportional when
valuations are additive, it may appear at first glance that the
price of envy-freeness must be at least as high as the price of
proportionality. This is not necessarily the case, however, be-
cause there are instances that admit proportional but no envy-
free allocations.2
To address these limitations, in this paper we study the
price of fairness for indivisible goods with respect to fairness
notions that can be satisfied in every instance. Among other
notions, we consider envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), bal-
ancedness, maximumNash welfare (MNW), and leximin.3 In
addition to deriving bounds on the price of fairness for these
notions, we also introduce the concept of strong price of fair-
ness, which captures the efficiency loss in the worst fair al-
location as opposed to that in the best fair allocation. The
relationship between the price of fairness and the strong price
1From the above example, one may think that such scenar-
ios are rare exceptions. However, for envy-freeness, these sce-
narios are in fact common if the number of goods is not too
large compared to the number of agents [Dickerson et al., 2014;
Manurangsi and Suksompong, 2019].
2Indeed, the instance that Caragiannis et al. used to show that the
price of proportionality is at least n− 1 + 1/n admits no envy-free
allocation. Thus, it is still possible that the price of envy-freeness is
lower than the price of proportionality.
3See Section 2 for the definitions of these notions.
Property P Price of P Strong price of P
General n n = 2 General n n = 2
Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1)
LB: Ω(
√
n)
UB: O(n)
LB: 8/7
UB: 2/
√
3
∞ ∞
Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) − 3/2 − ∞
Round-robin (RR) n 2 n2 4
Balancedness (BAL) Θ(
√
n) 4/3 ∞ ∞
Maximum Nash welfare (MNW) Θ(n)
LB: 27/23
UB: 5/4
Θ(n)
LB: 27/23
UB: 5/4
Maximum egalitarian welfare (MEW) Θ(n) 3/2 ∞ for n ≥ 3 3/2
Leximin (LEX) Θ(n) 3/2 Θ(n) 3/2
Pareto optimality (PO) 1 1 Θ(n2) 3
Table 1: Summary of our results. LB denotes lower bound and UB denotes upper bound. We do not consider the (strong) price of EFX for
n > 2 because it is not known whether an EFX allocation always exists. If we allow dependence on the number of goods m, we have an
upper bound of O(
√
n log(mn)) on the price of EF1.
of fairness is akin to that between the price of stability and
the price of anarchy for equilibria. While the strong price
of fairness is too demanding to yield any nontrivial guaran-
tee for some fairness notions, as we will see, it does provide
meaningful guarantees for other notions.
1.1 Our Results
The majority of our results can be found in Table 1; we high-
light a subset of these next. For the price of EF1, we provide a
lower bound ofΩ(
√
n) and an upper bound ofO(n). We then
show that two common ways to obtain an EF1 allocation—
the round-robin algorithm and MNW—have a price of fair-
ness of linear order (for round-robin the price is exactly n),
implying that these methods cannot be used to improve the
upper bound for EF1. We also show that improving this up-
per bound would yield a corresponding improvement on the
price of envy-freeness gap for divisible goods left open by
Caragiannis et al. [2012]. On the other hand, if we allow
dependence on the number of goods m, the price of EF1 is
O(
√
n log(mn))—this means that the Ω(
√
n) lower bound is
almost tight unless the number of goods is huge compared
to the number of agents. For MNW, maximum egalitarian
welfare (MEW), and leximin, we prove an asymptotically
tight bound of Θ(n) on the price of fairness. Moreover, with
the exception of EF1 and MNW, we establish exactly tight
bounds in the case of two agents for all fairness notions.
On the strong price of fairness front, we show via a simple
instance that the strong price of EF1 and balancedness are in-
finite, meaning that there are arbitrarily bad EF1 and balanced
allocations. Nevertheless, a round-robin allocation, which
satisfies these two properties, always has welfare within a
factor n2 of the optimal allocation, and this factor is exactly
tight. For MNW and leximin, the strong price of fairness,
like the price of fairness, is of linear order. However, while
the price of MEW is also Θ(n), the strong price of MEW is
infinite for n ≥ 3 (and 3/2 for n = 2). Finally, we consider
Pareto optimality, for which the price of fairness is trivially 1.
We show that the strong price of Pareto optimality is Θ(n2).
1.2 Related Work
The price of fairness was introduced independently by
Bertsimas et al. [2011] and Caragiannis et al. [2012]. Bert-
simas et al. studied the concept for divisible goods with re-
spect to fairness notions such as proportional fairness and
max-min fairness. Caragiannis et al. presented a number
of bounds for both goods and chores (i.e., items that yield
negative utility), both when these items are divisible and in-
divisible. The price of fairness has subsequently been ex-
amined in several other settings, including for contiguous
allocations of divisible goods [Aumann and Dombb, 2015],
indivisible goods [Suksompong, 2019], and divisible chores
[Heydrich and van Stee, 2015], as well as in the context of
machine scheduling [Bilo` et al., 2016].
Typically, the price of fairness study focuses on quantify-
ing the efficiency loss solely in terms of the number of agents.
A notable exception to this is the work of Kurz [2014], who
remarked that certain constructions used to establish worst-
case bounds for indivisible goods require a large number of
goods. As a result, Kurz investigated the dependence of the
price of fairness on both the number of agents and the num-
ber of goods, and found that the price indeed improves sig-
nificantly if we limit the number of goods.
2 Preliminaries
Denote by N = {1, 2, . . . , n} the set of agents and M =
{1, 2, . . . ,m} the set of goods. Each agent i has a non-
negative utility ui(j) for each good j. The agents’ utili-
ties are additive, meaning that ui(M
′) =
∑
j∈M ′ ui(j) for
every agent i and subset of goods M ′ ⊆ M . Following
Caragiannis et al. [2012], we normalize the utilities across
agents by assuming that ui(M) = 1 for all i. We refer
to a setting with agents, goods, and utility functions as an
instance. An allocation is a partition of M into bundles
(M1, . . . ,Mn) such that agent i receives bundle Mi. The
(utilitarian) social welfare of an allocation M is defined as
SW(M) := ∑ni=1 ui(Mi). The optimal social welfare for
an instance I , denoted by OPT(I), is the maximum social
welfare over all allocations for this instance.
A property P is a function that maps every instance I to a
(possibly empty) set of allocations P (I). Every allocation in
P (I) is said to satisfy property P .
We are now ready to define the price of fairness concepts.
Definition 2.1. For any given property P of allocations and
any instance, we define the price of P for that instance to be
the ratio between the optimal social welfare and the maxi-
mum social welfare over allocations satisfying P :
Price of P for instance I =
OPT(I)
maxM∈P (I) SW(M)
.
The overall price of P is then defined as the supremum price
of fairness across all instances.
Similarly, the strong price of P for a given instance is the
ratio between the optimal social welfare and the minimum so-
cial welfare over allocations satisfying P :
Strong price of P for instance I =
OPT(I)
minM∈P (I) SW(M)
.
The overall strong price of P is then defined as the supremum
price of fairness across all instances.
We will only consider properties P such that P (I) is
nonempty for every instance I , so the (strong) price of fair-
ness is always well-defined. With the exception of Theo-
rem 3.7, we will be interested in the price of fairness as a
function of n, and assume thatm can be arbitrary.
Next, we define the fairness properties that we consider.
The first two properties are relaxations of the classical envy-
freeness notion.
Definition 2.2 (EF1). An allocation is said to satisfy envy-
freeness up to one good (EF1) if for every pair of agents
i, i′, there exists a set Ai′ ⊆ Mi′ with |Ai′ | ≤ 1 such that
ui(Mi) ≥ ui(Mi′\Ai′).
Definition 2.3 (EFX). An allocation is said to satisfy envy-
freeness up to any good (EFX) if for every pair of agents i, i′
and every good g ∈Mi′ , we have ui(Mi) ≥ ui(Mi′\{g}).
It is clear that EFX imposes a stronger requirement than
EF1. An EF1 allocation always exists [Lipton et al., 2004],
while for EFX the existence question is still unresolved
[Caragiannis et al., 2016]. As such, we will only consider
EFX in the case of two agents, for which existence is guaran-
teed [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018].
The round-robin algorithm, which we describe be-
low, always computes an EF1 allocation (see, e.g.,
[Caragiannis et al., 2016]).
Definition 2.4 (RR). The round-robin algorithm works by
arranging the agents in some arbitrary order, and letting the
next agent in the order choose her favorite good from the re-
maining goods.4 An allocation is said to satisfy round-robin
(RR) if it is the result of applying the algorithm with some
ordering of the agents.
4In case there are ties between goods, we may assume worst-
case tie breaking, since it is possible to obtain an instance with
infinitesimal difference in welfare and any desired tie-breaking be-
tween goods by slightly perturbing the utilities.
Our next property is balancedness, which means that the
goods are as spread out among the agents as possible. Bal-
ancedness and similar cardinality constraints have been con-
sidered in recent work [Biswas and Barman, 2018]. In addi-
tion to satisfying EF1, an allocation produced by the round-
robin algorithm is also balanced.
Definition 2.5 (BAL). An allocation is said to be balanced
(BAL) if |Mi −Mj| ≤ 1 for any i, j.
Next, we define a number of welfare maximizers.
Definition 2.6 (MNW). The Nash welfare of an allocation is
defined as
∏
i∈N ui(Mi). An allocation is said to be a max-
imum Nash welfare (MNW) allocation if it has the maximum
Nash welfare among all allocations.5
Definition 2.7 (MEW). The egalitarian welfare of an alloca-
tion is defined asmini∈N ui(Mi). An allocation is said to be
a maximum egalitarian welfare (MEW) allocation if it has the
maximum egalitarian welfare among all allocations.
Definition 2.8 (LEX). An allocation is said to be leximin
(LEX) if it maximizes the lowest utility (i.e., the egalitarian
welfare), and, among all such allocations, maximizes the sec-
ond lowest utility, and so on.
Finally, we define Pareto optimality. While this is an effi-
ciency notion rather than a fairness notion, we also consider
it as it is a fundamental property in the context of resource
allocation.
Definition 2.9 (PO). Given an allocation (M1, . . . ,Mn), an-
other allocation (M ′1, . . . ,M
′
n) is said to be a Pareto improve-
ment if ui(M
′
i) ≥ ui(Mi) for all i with at least one strict in-
equality. An allocation is Pareto optimal (PO) if it does not
admit a Pareto improvement.
Caragiannis et al. [2016] showed that a MNW allo-
cation always satisfies EF1 and Pareto optimality. It
is clear from the definition that any leximin alloca-
tion is Pareto optimal and maximizes egalitarian wel-
fare. The problem of computing a MEW alloca-
tion has been studied by Beza´kova´ and Dani [2005] and
Bansal and Sviridenko [2006]. Leximin allocations were
studied by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2004] and shown to be
applicable in practice by Kurokawa et al. [2015].
3 Envy-Freeness
In this section, we consider envy-freeness relaxations and the
round-robin algorithm, which always produces an EF1 allo-
cation. We begin with a lower bound on the price of EF1.
Theorem 3.1. The price of EF1 is Ω(
√
n).
Proof. Let m = n, r = ⌊√n⌋, and assume that the utilities
are as follows:
• For i = 1, . . . , r − 1: ui((i − 1)r + j) = 1r for j =
1, . . . , r, and ui(j) = 0 otherwise.
5In the case where the maximum Nash welfare is 0, an allocation
is a MNW allocation if it gives positive utility to a set of agents of
maximal size and moreover maximizes the product of utilities of the
agents in that set.
• ur(j) = 1n−r(r−1) for j = r(r − 1) + 1, . . . , n, and
ur(j) = 0 otherwise.
• For i = r + 1, . . . , n: ui(j) = 1n for all j.
Consider the allocation that assigns goods ir−r+1, . . . , ir
to agent i for i = 1, . . . , r − 1 and the remaining goods to
agent r. The social welfare of this allocation is r. On the
other hand, in any EF1 allocation, each of the agents i =
r+1, . . . , nmust receive at least one good—otherwise some
agent would receive at least two goods and agent iwould envy
her. This means that the social welfare is at most r · 1r +(n−
r) · 1n < 2. Hence the price of EF1 is at least r2 = ⌊
√
n⌋
2 .
For two agents, we establish an almost tight bound on the
price of EF1 and a tight bound on the price of EFX.
Theorem 3.2. For n = 2, the price of EF1 is at least 87 ≈
1.143 and at most 2√
3
≈ 1.155.
Proof. Lower bound: Let m = 3 and 0 < ǫ < 1/6, and
assume that the utilities are as follows:
• u1(1) = 1/3− 2ǫ, u1(2) = 1/3 + ǫ, u1(3) = 1/3 + ǫ
• u2(1) = 0, u2(2) = 1/2, u2(3) = 1/2
The optimal social welfare is 4/3−2ǫ, achieved by assigning
the first good to agent 1 and the last two goods to agent 2.
However, in any EF1 allocation the last two goods cannot
both be given to agent 2. Hence the social welfare of an EF1
allocation is at most (1/3− 2ǫ)+ (1/3+ ǫ)+1/2 = 7/6− ǫ.
Taking ǫ → 0, we find that the price of EF1 is at least 4/37/6 =
8/7.
Upper bound: Consider an arbitrary instance. Sort the goods
so that
u1(1)
u2(1)
≥ u1(2)u2(2) ≥ · · · ≥
u1(m)
u2(m)
; goods x such that
u2(x) = 0 are put at the front and those with u1(x) = 0 at the
back, with arbitrary tie-breaking within each group of goods.
(Goods that yield zero value to both agents can be safely ig-
nored since they have no effect on the optimal welfare or the
maximum welfare of an EF1 allocation.) For ease of nota-
tion, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ m we write L(k) := {1, . . . , k} and
R(k) := {k, . . . ,m}. We also define L(0) = R(m+1) = ∅.
Let S1 := {i | u1(i)u2(i) > 1} = L(s) for some 0 ≤ s ≤ m
and S2 := M \ S1 = R(s+ 1). It is easy to see that s < m.
If s = 0, both agents have identical valuations and the price
of EF1 is 1, so we may assume that s > 0. The allocation
S = (S1, S2) is an optimal allocation, and the optimal so-
cial welfare is u1(S1) + u2(S2). Without loss of general-
ity, assume that u1(S1) ≤ u2(S2). Note that we must have
u2(S2) ≥ 12 , since otherwise both u1(S1) and u2(S2) are
smaller than 12 and switching S1 and S2 would yield a higher
social welfare. We can further assume that u1(S1) <
1
2 , be-
cause otherwise S is also an EF1 allocation and the price of
fairness is 1.
Next, we describe how to obtain a particular EF1 alloca-
tion F . Let f be the smallest index such that f ≥ s and
u1(L(f)) ≥ u1(R(f +2)). Clearly, f < m. In the allocation
F = (F1, F2), we assign the goods F1 := L(f) to agent 1,
and F2 := R(f + 1) to agent 2.
Allocation F satisfies EF1. The EF1 condition is satisfied
for agent 1, because u1(F1) ≥ u1(F2\{f+1}) by definition.
For agent 2, since f is the smallest index such that f ≥ s
and u1(L(f)) ≥ u1(R(f + 2)), we have either f = s or
u1(L(f − 1)) < u1(R(f + 1)).
If f = s, then F coincides with the optimal allocation S,
and u2(F2) = u2(S2) ≥ 12 . Clearly EF1 is satisfied.
Else, f > s, and we have 0 < u1(L(f − 1)) < u1(R(f +
1)). Note also that u2(R(f + 1)) > 0. Therefore,
u1(L(f − 1))
u2(L(f − 1)) ≥
u1(f − 1)
u2(f − 1)
≥ u1(f + 1)
u2(f + 1)
≥ u1(R(f + 1))
u2(R(f + 1))
,
where we take a fraction to be infinite if it has denominator 0.
(None of the fractions can have both numerator and denomi-
nator 0.) This implies that
u2(L(f − 1))
u2(R(f + 1))
≤ u1(L(f − 1))
u1(R(f + 1))
< 1.
Thus,
u2(F2) = u2(R(f + 1)) > u2(L(f − 1)) = u2(F1\{f}),
implying that EF1 is again satisfied.
The price of EF1 for this instance is at most 2√
3
. Now we
analyze the social welfare of the allocation F and compare it
to the optimal social welfare.
If f = s, the price of EF1 is 1. Assume from now on that
f > s. We have u1(F2) > u1(L(f − 1)) ≥ u1(L(s)) =
u1(S1) and
u1(S2)
u2(S2)
≥ u1(F2)u2(F2) . Since u1(F2) > 0, we also
have u1(S2) > 0. Moreover, u2(F2), u2(S2) > 0. Thus,
u1(F1) + u2(F2) ≥ (1 − u1(F2)) + u1(F2)u2(S2)
u1(S2)
= 1 +
(
u2(S2)
u1(S2)
− 1
)
u1(F2)
> 1 +
(
u2(S2)
u1(S2)
− 1
)
u1(S1)
=
u2(S2)
1− u1(S1) + 1− u2(S2)− u1(S1).
Therefore the ratio between the optimal social welfare and the
social welfare of F is
α :=
u1(S1) + u2(S2)
u1(F1) + u2(F2)
<
u1(S1) + u2(S2)
u2(S2)
1−u1(S1) + 1− u2(S2)− u1(S1)
.
We further analyze the last expression. First, taking its par-
tial derivative with respect to u2(S2) gives
(1− u1(S1))(1− 2u1(S1))
(u1(S1)2 + u1(S1)(u2(S2)− 2) + 1)2 ,
which is always positive when u1(S1) <
1
2 . This shows that
the last expression is monotone increasing in u2(S2). Thus
α <
u1(S1) + 1
1
1−u1(S1) − u1(S1)
.
Finally, this expression is maximized when u1(S1) = 2−
√
3
and yields a value of 2√
3
, completing the proof.
Theorem 3.3. For n = 2, the price of EFX is 3/2.
Proof. Lower bound: Let m = 3 and 0 < ǫ < 1/2, and
assume that the utilities are as follows:
• u1(1) = 1/2 + ǫ, u1(2) = 1/2− ǫ, u1(3) = 0.
• u2(1) = 1/2 + ǫ, u2(2) = 0, u2(3) = 1/2− ǫ.
The optimal social welfare is 3/2−ǫ, achieved by assigning
the first two goods to agent 1 and the last good to agent 2.
On the other hand, in any EFX allocation, no agent can get
both of the goods that they positively value. Hence, the social
welfare of an EFX allocation is at most 1. Taking ǫ → 0, we
find that the price of EFX is at least 3/2.
Upper bound: Consider an arbitrary instance. If in an optimal
allocation both agents get utility at least 1/2, this allocation
is also envy-free and hence EFX, so the price of EFX is 1.
Otherwise, the maximum welfare is at most 1 + 1/2 = 3/2.
Now we show that there always exists an EFX allocation with
social welfare at least 1; this immediately yields the desired
bound.
Let the first agent partition the goods into two bundles such
that her values for the bundles are as equal as possible. De-
note by x and 1 − x the values of the two bundles, where
x ≥ 1 − x. Suppose that all goods of zero value, if any, are
in the second bundle. Let y ≥ 1 − y be the corresponding
values for the second agent, and assume without loss of gen-
erality that y ≥ x. Consider the partition of the first agent,
and assume that the two bundles yield value z and 1 − z to
the second agent, respectively. If z ≤ 1 − z, by assigning
the first bundle to the first agent and the second bundle to the
second agent, we have an envy-free allocation with welfare
at least 1. Else, z ≥ 1 − z. By definition of y, we also have
z ≥ y ≥ x. We assign the first bundle to the second agent
and the second bundle to the first agent. The second agent is
clearly envy-free. If the first agent still has envy after remov-
ing some good i from the first bundle, then by moving good
i to the second bundle, we create a more equal partition, a
contradiction. Hence the allocation is EFX to the first agent.
The social welfare of this allocation is z + (1− x) ≥ 1.
Next, we give a simple instance showing that EF1 and EFX
allocations can have arbitrarily bad welfare.
Theorem 3.4. The strong price of EF1 is∞. For n = 2, the
strong price of EFX is∞.
Proof. Let m = n, and assume that ui(i) = 1 for all i and
ui(j) = 0 otherwise. The allocation that assigns good i to
agent i for every i has social welfare n. On the other hand, the
allocation that assigns good i − 1 to agent i for i = 2, . . . , n
and good n to agent 1 is EF1 and EFX, but has social welfare
0. The conclusion follows.
We now turn our attention to the round-robin algorithm.
We show that it is always possible to order the agents to obtain
a welfare of 1.
Lemma 3.5. For any instance, there exists an ordering of the
agents such that the round-robin algorithm implemented with
this ordering produces an allocation with social welfare at
least 1, and this bound is tight.
Proof. We claim that if we choose the ordering of the agents
uniformly at random, the expected social welfare is at least 1.
The desired bound immediately follows from this claim.
To prove the claim, consider an arbitrary agent i, and as-
sume without loss of generality that ui(1) ≥ ui(2) ≥ . . . ≥
ui(m). Note that if the agent is ranked jth in the ordering,
her utility is at least ui(j) + ui(n+ j) + ui(2n+ j) + · · ·+
ui(kn + j), where k = ⌊(m − j)/n⌋. Hence, the agent’s
expected utility is at least
1
n
·
n∑
j=1
⌊(m−j)/n⌋∑
r=0
ui(rn+ j) =
1
n
·
m∑
j=1
ui(j) =
1
n
.
It follows from linearity of expectation that the expected so-
cial welfare is at least n · 1n = 1, as claimed.
The tightness of the bound follows from the instance where
every agent has utility 1 for the same good.
Lemma 3.5 yields a linear price of fairness for round-robin.
Theorem 3.6. The price of round-robin is n. Consequently,
the price of EF1 is at most n.
Proof. Upper bound: Consider an arbitrary instance. Since
every agent receives utility at most 1, the optimal social wel-
fare is at most n. On the other hand, by Lemma 3.5, there
exists an ordering of the agents such that the round-robin al-
gorithm yields welfare at least 1. Hence the price of round-
robin is at most n.
Lower bound: Let m = xn for some large x that is divisible
by n, and assume that the utilities are such that for each agent
i, ui(j) = 1/x
i for j = 1, . . . , xi and ui(j) = 0 otherwise.
Consider the allocation that assigns goods 1, . . . , x to agent
1, and xi−1 + 1, . . . , xi to agent i for every i ≥ 2. In this
allocation, agent 1 gets utility 1, while each remaining agent
gets utility (xi − xi−1)/xi = 1 − 1/x. The social welfare is
therefore n− (n− 1)/x. This converges to n for large x.
On the other hand, consider the round-robin algorithmwith
an arbitrary ordering of the agents, and assume without loss
of generality that agents always break ties in favor of goods
with lower numbers. Hence, regardless of the ordering, the
goods get chosen in the order 1, 2, . . . ,m. As a result, every
agent gets exactly 1/n of their valued goods, so her utility is
1/n, and the social welfare is 1. Hence the price of round-
robin is n.
The argument for the lower bound in Theorem 3.6 works
even if we can choose a new ordering of the agents in every
round. This means that the fixed order is not a barrier to ob-
taining a better price of fairness, but rather the “each agent
picks exactly once in every round” aspect of the algorithm.
One may notice that the lower bound construction uses an
exponential number of goods. This is in fact necessary to
obtain an instance with a high price of round-robin. As we
show next, the Ω(
√
n) lower bound on the price of EF1 is
almost tight as long asm is not too large compared to n.
Theorem 3.7. The price of round-robin is O(
√
n log(mn)).
Consequently, the price of EF1 is O(
√
n log(mn)).
Proof. Consider any instance I . We claim that there exists
an ordering for which the round-robin algorithm produces an
allocation with social welfare at least
OPT(I)
65
√
n log2(mn)
. First,
observe that if OPT(I) ≤ 65√n log2(mn), then Lemma 3.5
immediately yields the desired claim. Henceforth, we will
only focus on the case where OPT(I) > 65
√
n log2(mn).
Fix an optimal allocation M = (M1, . . . ,Mn), and let
r := ⌈log2(m
√
n)⌉. For each i ∈ N , let us partitionMi into
M0i ∪M1i ∪ · · · ∪M ri , whereM ℓi is defined by
M ℓi =
{{j ∈Mi | ui(j) ∈ (2−ℓ−1, 2−ℓ]} if ℓ 6= r;
{j ∈Mi | ui(j) ∈ [0, 2−ℓ]} if ℓ = r.
Furthermore, define M ℓ := ∪ni=1M ℓi and SWℓ(M) :=∑n
i=1 ui(M
ℓ
i ).
Let ℓ∗ := argmaxℓ∈{0,...,r−1} SWℓ(M). We have
SWℓ∗(M) ≥ 1
r
(
r−1∑
ℓ=0
SWℓ(M)
)
=
OPT(I)− SWr(M)
r
.
However, since agent i values each item in M ri at most
2−r ≤ 1
m
√
n
, we have ui(M
r
i ) ≤ 1/
√
n. This implies that
SWr(M) ≤
√
n, which is no more than OPT(I)/65. Hence,
SWℓ∗(M) ≥ 64
65r
·OPT(I) ≥ 32 · OPT(I)
65 log2(mn)
. (1)
Thus, it suffices to show the existence of an ordering such
that round-robin produces an allocation with social welfare at
least SWℓ∗(M)/
√
n.
Observe that (1) implies that SWℓ∗(M) > 32√n. We now
consider two cases, based on T := |M ℓ∗ |. Since ui(M ℓ∗i ) ≤
2−ℓ
∗ |M ℓ∗i | for each i, we have SWℓ∗(M) ≤ 2−ℓ
∗
T .
Case 1: T > 2n. In this case, we will show that the round-
robin algorithm with arbitrary ordering yields an allocation
with social welfare at least SWℓ∗(M)/√n.
To see this, let us consider the round-robin procedure with
arbitrary ordering, and consider the set of goods that are
picked in the first t := ⌊T/(2n)⌋ rounds; let St ⊆ M de-
note this set. Now, observe that
n∑
i=1
|M ℓ∗i \ St| ≥ T − |St| = T − n · t ≥
T
2
.
This implies that
n∑
i=1
ui(M
ℓ∗
i \ St) ≥
T
2
· 2−ℓ∗−1 ≥ SWℓ∗(M)
4
> 8
√
n.
Since ui(M
ℓ∗
i \St) ≤ 1, there must be more than 8
√
n agents
such thatM ℓ
∗
i * St. LetN
∗ denote the set of such agents.
We claim that, in each of the first t rounds, every agent
i ∈ N∗ must receive an item she values at least 2−ℓ∗−1. The
reason is that agent i picks her favorite good, which she must
value at least as much as the good(s) left unpicked inM ℓ
∗
i \St.
Moreover, she values the latter at least 2−ℓ
∗−1, so this must
also be a lower bound of her utility for the former.
From the claim in the previous paragraph, we can conclude
that the social welfare of the allocation produced is at least
|N∗| · t · 2−ℓ∗−1 > 8√n · T
4n
· 2−ℓ∗−1 ≥ SWℓ∗(M)√
n
as desired. Note that we use the assumption T > 2n to con-
clude that t ≥ T/(4n) in the first inequality above.
Case 2: T ≤ 2n. In this case, we will show that if we
choose the ordering π in a careful manner, then the social
welfare obtained in the first round alone already suffices.
Similarly to Case 1, observe that since
∑n
i=1 ui(M
ℓ∗
i ) =
SWℓ∗(M) > 8
√
n, there are more than 8
√
n agents i whose
M ℓ
∗
i is non-empty. LetN
∗ denote the set of such agents.
We will construct the ordering π step-by-step as follows.
For k = 1, . . . , ⌈4√n⌉, we let π(k) be any agent i such that
(1) i is not yet in the ordering and (2) not all goods in M ℓ
∗
i
are already picked by π(1), . . . , π(k − 1). Note that such an
agent exists because, at each step k, at most two candidate
agents become invalid: the agent i = π(k), and the agent i′
whose good in M ℓ
∗
i′ is picked by π(k). Since we start with
8
√
n valid candidates, even after ⌈4√n⌉ − 1 steps, there are
still valid candidate agents to be chosen from.
The remainder of the ordering can be chosen arbitrarily.
We now argue that the resulting round-robin allocation has
the desired social welfare. To see this, for k = 1, . . . , ⌈4√n⌉,
observe that agent π(k)must pick a good that is worth at least
2−ℓ
∗−1 to her in the first round, since not all goods in M ℓ
∗
π(k)
have been picked. As a result, the social welfare is at least
(4
√
n) · 2−ℓ∗−1 ≥ (2T/√n) · 2−ℓ∗−1 ≥ SWℓ∗(M)√
n
,
where the first inequality follows from T ≤ 2n.
While Theorem 3.7 shows that the price of EF1 is close
to Θ(
√
n) unless the number of goods is huge, if we are
only interested in the dependence on the number of agents,
the gap still remains between Ω(
√
n) and O(n). In fact,
Caragiannis et al. [2012] left exactly the same gap on the
price of envy-freeness for divisible goods. In Section 7, we
exhibit an interesting connection between the indivisible and
divisible goods settings by showing that the price of EF1 for
indivisible goods is always at least the price of envy-freeness
for divisible goods. This implies that improving the O(n)
upper bound on the price of EF1 would also yield a corre-
sponding improvement on the price of envy-freeness.
We end this section by establishing an exact bound on the
strong price of round-robin.
Theorem 3.8. The strong price of round-robin is n2.
Proof. Upper bound: Consider an arbitrary instance. Since
every agent receives utility at most 1, the optimal social wel-
fare is at most n. On the other hand, in the round-robin algo-
rithm, the first agent gets to choose an item ahead of all other
agents in every round and therefore does not envy any other
agent in the resulting allocation. This implies that her utility,
and hence the social welfare, is at least 1/n. It follows that
the strong price of round-robin is at most n2.
Lower bound: Let m be a large number divisible by n, and
assume that the utilities are as follows:
• u1(i) = 1m for all i.
• For i = 2, . . . , n: ui(i − 1) = 1, and ui(j) = 0 other-
wise.
Consider the allocation that assigns good i − 1 to agent i
for every i = 2, . . . , n, and the remaining goods to agent 1.
In this allocation, every agent i ≥ 2 receives utility 1. Agent
1 receives utility m−n+1m , which converges to 1 for large m.
Therefore the social welfare converges to n.
On the other hand, consider the round-robin algorithmwith
the ordering of the agents 1, . . . , n, and assume without loss
of generality that agents always break ties in favor of goods
with lower numbers. The first agent gets utility exactly 1/n,
while the remaining agents get zero utility since their only
valuable good is “stolen” by the agent before them in the first
round. Hence the social welfare is 1/n. This means that the
strong price of round-robin is n2, as desired.
4 Balancedness
In this section, we consider balancedness. We begin by es-
tablishing an asymptotically tight bound on the price of bal-
ancedness.
Theorem 4.1. The price of balancedness is Θ(
√
n).
Proof. Lower bound: Consider the instance in Theorem 3.1.
The social welfare can be as high as r = ⌊√n⌋, while a sim-
ilar argument shows that the social welfare of any balanced
allocation is at most 2. The conclusion follows.
Upper bound: We claim that for any instance I , the maxi-
mum social welfare of a balanced allocation is always within
a factor 4
√
n of the optimal social welfare; this claim im-
plies the desired upper bound. If OPT(I) ≤ 4√n, the claim
follows immediately from Lemma 3.5. We therefore assume
that OPT(I) > 4
√
n. We will show that there is a balanced
allocationM such that SW(M) ≥ OPT(I)−
√
n
2
√
n
; this suffices
for our claim because
OPT(I)−√n
2
√
n
≥ OPT(I)
4
√
n
. We consider
two cases.
Case 1: m ≥ n. Fix an optimal allocation, and let A be
the set of agents who receive at least m√
n
goods in the optimal
allocation, and B the complement set of agents. Since there
are at most
√
n agents in A, they contribute at most
√
n to
OPT(I), so the agents inB contribute at leastOPT(I)−√n.
We let each agent inB keep her
⌈
m
2n
⌉
most valuable goods (or
all of her goods, if she has fewer than this number of goods).
This yields a total utility of at least
OPT(I)−√n
2
√
n
. Since
⌈
m
2n
⌉ ≤⌊
m
n
⌋
due to the assumption m ≥ n, the remaining goods
can be reallocated to obtain a balanced allocation, which has
social welfare at least
OPT(I)−√n
2
√
n
.
Case 2: m < n. Fix an optimal allocation, and let A be
the set of agents who receive at least
√
n goods in the optimal
allocation, and B the complement set of agents. Since there
are at most
√
n agents in A, they contribute at most
√
n to
OPT(I), so the agents inB contribute at leastOPT(I)−√n.
We let each agent in B keep her most valuable good (if she
receives at least one good). This yields a total utility of at
least
OPT(I)−√n√
n
. The remaining goods can be reallocated to
obtain a balanced allocation, which has social welfare at least
OPT(I)−√n√
n
≥ OPT(I)−
√
n
2
√
n
.
For two agents, we give an exact bound on the welfare that
can be lost due to imposing balancedness.
Theorem 4.2. For n = 2, the price of balancedness is 4/3.
Proof. Lower bound: Let m be a large even number, and as-
sume that the utilities are as follows:
• u1(1) = 1 and u1(i) = 0 otherwise.
• u2(i) = 1m for all i.
Consider the allocation that assigns the first good to the first
agent and the remaining goods to the second agent. The social
welfare is 1 + (1 − 1/m), which converges to 2 for large
m. On the other hand, in any balanced allocation, the first
agent gets utility at most 1 while the second agent gets utility
m
2 · 1m = 12 , so the social welfare is at most 3/2. Hence the
price of balancedness is at least 4/3.
Upper bound: Consider an arbitrary instance. If m is odd,
we may add a dummy good that yields zero utility to both
agents—this does not change the optimal social welfare or
the maximum social welfare of a balanced allocation. We
may therefore assume thatm is even.
Sort the goods so that u1(1) − u2(1) ≥ u1(2) − u2(2) ≥
· · · ≥ u1(m) − u2(m). Let s be the last good such that
u1(s) − u2(s) ≥ 0, and assume without loss of general-
ity that s ≥ m/2. An optimal allocation assigns the set
of goods S1 = {1, . . . , s} to the first agent and the com-
plement set S2 to the second agent, yielding social welfare
u1(S1) + u2(S2) = u1(S1) + (1− u2(S1)) = 1 +∆, where
∆ := u1(S1)− u2(S1) ≥ 0. On the other hand, consider the
balanced allocation that assigns goods 1, . . . ,m/2 to the first
agent and the remaining goods to the second agent. Note that
at most half of the goods in S1 are reallocated to the second
agent, and these are the goods with the lowest difference in
utility between the two agents. Hence, the utility loss going
from the first to the second allocation is at most ∆/2, imply-
ing that the social welfare of the second allocation is at least
1 + ∆2 . The price of balancedness is therefore at most
sup
0≤∆≤1
1 + ∆
1 + ∆2
.
This ratio is increasing in ∆ and reaches the maximum at
∆ = 1, where its value is 4/3, completing the proof.
Finally, the same construction as in Theorem 3.4 shows
that balanced allocations can have arbitrarily bad welfare.
Theorem 4.3. The strong price of balancedness is∞.
5 Welfare Maximizers
In this section, we consider allocations that maximize differ-
ent measures of welfare. To start with, we show that every
MNW and leximin allocation yields a decent welfare.
Lemma 5.1. For any instance, every MNW allocation and
every leximin allocation has social welfare at least 1, and
both bounds are tight.
Proof. We first establish the bound for MNW. Consider any
MNW allocation where agent i receives bundle Mi, and as-
sume for contradiction that
∑n
k=1 uk(Mk) < 1. Fix any
agent i. Since
∑n
k=1 ui(Mk) = 1, there exists j 6= i such that
ui(Mj) > uj(Mj). Construct a directed graph with vertices
1, 2, . . . , n, and add an edge from i to j if ui(Mj) > uj(Mj).
Since every vertex has at least one outgoing edge, the graph
consists of a directed cycle. For every edge i→ j in the cycle,
we giveMj to agent i instead of agent j. If we consider the
change in the multiset of the n utilities between the old and
new allocations, at least one number increases while others
remain the same. This means that either we have decreased
the number of agents who get zero utility, or keep this number
fixed and increase the product of utilities of the agents who
get nonzero utility. Either case contradicts the definition of
an MNW allocation.
To show the bound for leximin, we apply the same argu-
ment. An improvement in the multiset of utilities as described
in the last step contradicts the definition of leximin.
Finally, the tightness of the bounds follows from the in-
stance where every agent has utility 1 for the same good.
Lemma 5.1 allows us to show that the price of MNW and
the strong price of MNW are both of linear order. Similar
techniques can be used for the price of MEW and both prices
of leximin, as we establish in the two subsequent theorems.
Theorem 5.2. The price of MNW and the strong price of
MNW are Θ(n).
Proof. It suffices to show that the price of MNW is Ω(n) and
the strong price of MNW is O(n).
Lower bound: Let m = n and 0 < ǫ < 1, and assume that
the utilities are as follows:
• u1(1) = 1 and u1(j) = 0 otherwise.
• For i = 2, . . . , n: ui(i − 1) = 1 − ǫ, ui(i) = ǫ, and
ui(j) = 0 otherwise.
Consider the allocation that assigns good i − 1 to agent i
for i = 2, . . . , n, and good n to agent 1. The social welfare
of this allocation is (n − 1)(1 − ǫ). On the other hand, the
unique MNW allocation assigns good i to agent i for every i.
The social welfare of this allocation is 1 + (n − 1)ǫ. Taking
ǫ→ 0, we find that the price of MNW is Ω(n).
Upper bound: Consider an arbitrary instance. Since every
agent receives utility at most 1, the optimal social welfare
is at most n. On the other hand, by Lemma 5.1, the social
welfare of any MNW allocation is at least 1. The conclusion
follows.
Theorem 5.3. The price of MEW is Θ(n).
Proof. Lower bound: Consider the instance in Theorem 5.2.
For ǫ → 0, the social welfare of the optimal allocation ap-
proaches n− 1, while the social welfare of the unique MEW
allocation approaches 1.
Upper bound: First, we claim that for any instance, there ex-
ists a MEW allocation with social welfare at least 1. To prove
this claim, we apply the same argument as in Lemma 5.1, but
starting with a MEW allocation with maximum social wel-
fare. An improvement in the multiset of utilities as described
in the argument does not decrease the egalitarian welfare and
strictly increases the social welfare, which gives us the de-
sired contradiction.
Combined with the observation that the optimal social wel-
fare is at most n in any instance, this claim immediately yields
the desired upper bound.
Theorem 5.4. The price of leximin and the strong price of
leximin are Θ(n).
Proof. Since all leximin allocations have the same social wel-
fare for any given instance, it suffices to show the statement
for the price of leximin.
Lower bound: Consider the instance in Theorem 5.2. For
ǫ→ 0, the social welfare of the optimal allocation approaches
n−1, while the social welfare of the unique leximin allocation
approaches 1.
Upper bound: Consider an arbitrary instance. Since every
agent receives utility at most 1, the optimal social welfare
is at most n. On the other hand, by Lemma 5.1, the social
welfare of any leximin allocation is at least 1. The conclusion
follows.
Surprisingly, MEW allocations can be arbitrarily bad when
there are at least three agents.
Theorem 5.5. For n > 2, the strong price of MEW is infinite.
Proof. Let m = n, and assume that the utilities are as fol-
lows:
• u1(1) = 1 and u1(j) = 0 otherwise.
• For i = 2, . . . , n: ui(i − 1) = 1 and ui(j) = 0 other-
wise.
Observe that in any allocation, some agent does not get a
desired good. This means that every allocation has egalitar-
ian welfare 0, and all allocations are MEW. Now, there exists
an allocation with social welfare 0, for example the allocation
that assigns good i + 1 to agent i for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, and
assigns good 1 to agent n. Since there also exists an alloca-
tion with positive social welfare, the strong price of MEW is
infinite.
We now turn to the case of two agents. For MNW, we
establish almost tight bounds on both prices of fairness.
Theorem 5.6. For n = 2, the price of MNW and the strong
price of MNW are at least 27/23 ≈ 1.174 and at most 5/4 =
1.25.
Proof. It suffices to show that the price of MNW is at least
27/23 and the strong price of MNW is at most 5/4.
Lower bound: Letm = 3 and 0 < ǫ < 1/7, and assume that
the utilities are as follows:
• u1(1) = 2/3, u1(2) = 1/3, u1(3) = 0.
• u2(1) = 4/7− ǫ, u2(2) = 1/7 + ǫ, u2(3) = 2/7.
The optimal social welfare is 9/7, obtained by assigning
the first two goods to the first agent and the last good to the
second agent. On the other hand, one can check that the
maximum Nash welfare is 2/7 + 2ǫ/3, obtained (uniquely)
by assigning the first good to the first agent and the last two
goods to the second agent. This allocation yields social wel-
fare 23/21+ ǫ. Taking ǫ→ 0, we find that the price of MNW
is at least 27/23.
Upper bound: Consider an arbritrary instance. Suppose that
the optimal social welfare is x. If x ≤ 5/4, then Lemma 5.1
immediately implies that the price of MNW of this instance
is at most 5/4.
We now focus on the case where x ≥ 5/4. Let us assume
further that, in an optimal allocation, the first agent has utility
x1 and the second has utility x2, where x1 ≥ x2 and x1 +
x2 = x. Since x1 ≤ 1, we have x1/x2 ≤ 1/(x− 1) ≤ 4.
Next, consider any MNW allocation. Suppose that in this
allocation the first agent has utility y1 and the second has util-
ity y2. Since the Nash welfare of this allocation must be at
least that of the optimal allocation, we have y1y2 ≥ x1x2.
As a result, the social welfare of this allocation is y1 + y2 ≥
2
√
y1y2 ≥ 2√x1x2, where the first inequality follows from
(
√
y1 −√y2)2 ≥ 0. Thus, the price of MNW of this instance
is at most
x1 + x2
2
√
x1x2
= 1 +
1
2
·
(
4
√
x1
x2
− 4
√
x2
x1
)2
≤ 1 + 1
2
·
(
4
√
4− 4
√
1
4
)2
= 5/4,
where the inequality follows from 1 ≤ x1/x2 ≤ 4.
Finally, we derive the exact bound for MEW and leximin
with two agents. Note that since all leximin allocations are
MEW, Theorem 5.7 immediately implies Theorem 5.8.
Theorem 5.7. For n = 2, the price of MEW and the strong
price of MEW are 3/2.
Proof. It suffices to show that the price of MEW is at least
3/2 and the strong price of MEW is at most 3/2.
Lower bound: Letm = 3 and 0 < ǫ < 1/2, and assume that
the utilities are as follows:
• u1(1) = 1/2, u1(2) = 1/2− ǫ, u1(3) = ǫ.
• u2(1) = 1/2, u2(2) = ǫ, u2(3) = 1/2− ǫ.
The optimal social welfare is 3/2−2ǫ, obtained by assign-
ing the first two goods to the first agent and the last good to
the second agent. On the other hand, the maximum egalitar-
ian welfare is 1/2, which can be obtained only by assigning
the first good to one agent and the remaining two goods to
the other agent. This allocation has social welfare 1. Taking
ǫ→ 0, we find that the price of MEW is at least 3/2.
Upper bound: Consider an arbitrary instance, and denote by x
the maximum egalitarian welfare. The optimal social welfare
is at most 1+x, and the social welfare of anyMEW allocation
is at least 2x. Consider any MEW allocation, and suppose
that agent 1 receives utility x and agent 2 receives utility y ≥
x. In the allocation where the bundles of the two agents are
swapped, the utilities are 1 − x and 1 − y ≤ 1 − x. Since x
is the maximum egalitarian welfare, we have x ≥ 1 − y, or
x+ y ≥ 1. This means that the social welfare of the original
allocation is at least 1, so the social welfare of any MEW
allocation is at least max{2x, 1}.
The strong price of MEW is therefore at most 1+xmax{2x,1} .
If x ≤ 1/2, this quantity is at most 1+x1 ≤ 32 . On the other
hand, if x > 1/2, this quantity is at most 1+x2x =
1
2x +
1
2 <
3
2 .
The conclusion follows.
Theorem 5.8. For n = 2, the price of leximin and the strong
price of leximin are 3/2.
6 Pareto Optimality
In this section, we consider Pareto optimality. Since any al-
location that maximizes social welfare is necessarily Pareto
optimal, the price of Pareto optimality is trivially 1. By estab-
lishing a tight lower bound on the welfare of a Pareto optimal
allocation, we show that the strong price of Pareto optimality
is quadratic. Our result indicates that while Pareto optimality
is sometimes referred to as ‘efficiency’, it does not necessarily
fare well if efficiency is measured in terms of social welfare.
Lemma 6.1. For any instance, every Pareto optimal alloca-
tion has social welfare at least 1/n, and this bound is tight.
Proof. To establish the bound, it suffices to show that in any
Pareto optimal allocation, some agent receives utility at least
1/n. Suppose that this is not the case. Since the utility of
each agent for the entire set of goods is 1, every agent envies
at least one other agent. This implies that the envy graph,
which has the n agents as its vertices and in which there is a
directed edge from one agent to another if the former agent
envies the latter, contains a directed cycle. By giving agent
j’s bundle to agent i for every edge i → j in the cycle, we
obtain a Pareto improvement, a contradiction.
The tightness of the bound follows from the instance in
Theorem 6.2.
Theorem 6.2. The strong price of Pareto optimality isΘ(n2).
Proof. Upper bound: Consider an arbitrary instance. Since
every agent receives utility at most 1, the optimal social wel-
fare is at most n. On the other hand, by Lemma 6.1, every
Pareto optimal allocation has social welfare at least 1/n. The
conclusion follows.
Lower bound: Assume that n ≥ 2. Letm = n, 0 < ǫ < 1/n,
and assume that the utilities are as follows:
• u1(1) = 1n + ǫ and u1(j) = 1n − ǫn−1 otherwise.
• For i = 2, . . . , n: ui(i − 1) = 1 − ǫ, ui(i) = ǫ, and
ui(j) = 0 otherwise.
Consider the allocation that assigns good i − 1 to agent
i for i = 2, . . . , n, and good n to agent 1. The wel-
fare of this allocation is (n − 1)(1 − ǫ) +
(
1
n − ǫn−1
)
=
n − 1 + 1n −
(
n− 1 + 1n−1
)
ǫ. On the other hand, the allo-
cation that assigns good i to agent i for i = 1, . . . , n is Pareto
optimal. This is because in any Pareto improvement, agent 1
must receive good 1, and it follows that agent i must receive
good i for every i. The social welfare of this allocation is(
1
n + ǫ
)
+ (n − 1)ǫ = 1n + nǫ. Taking ǫ → 0 yields the
desired result.
We also show an exact bound for the case of two agents.
Theorem 6.3. For n = 2, the strong price of Pareto optimal-
ity is 3.
Proof. The instance in Theorem 6.2 shows that the strong
price of Pareto optimality is at least 3. To show that this is
tight, consider an arbitrary instance and an optimal alloca-
tion in this instance. Assume that the two agents receive util-
ity x and y in this allocation, where x ≥ y. In any Pareto
optimal allocation, at least one agent must receive utility at
least y; otherwise the optimal allocation is a Pareto improve-
ment. In combination with Lemma 6.1, this implies that the
social welfare of every Pareto optimal allocation is at least
max{y, 1/2}.
The strong price of Pareto optimality is therefore at most
x+y
max{y,1/2} ≤ 1+ymax{y,1/2} . If y ≤ 1/2, this quantity is at most
2(1 + y) ≤ 3. On the other hand, if y > 1/2, this quantity is
at most 1+yy =
1
y + 1 < 3. The conclusion follows.
7 Relating Indivisible and Divisible Goods
In this section, we establish a relationship between the price
of EF1 for indivisible goods and the price of envy-freeness
(henceforth EF) for divisible goods. Our main result is the
following:
Theorem 7.1. For every number of agents n, the price of
EF1 (for indivisible goods) is no less than the price of EF
(for divisible goods).
The intuition for this result is that we can partition a di-
visible good into infinitesimally small pieces of indivisible
goods. The key point here is that (1) the optimal allocation
remains the same, and (2) EF1 allocations in the new instance
correspond to EF allocations in the old instance, since the
possible one-good offset has negligible value for each agent.
7.1 Preliminaries for Divisible Goods
To formally argue about the price of envy-freeness for divis-
ible goods, we first give precise definitions for the divisible
goods setting. Here we adopt the conventions from the cake-
cutting literature (see, e.g., [Procaccia, 2016]).
A cake is defined as the interval [0, 1]. A piece of cake is
a union of countable6 disjoint intervals; let Σ denote the set
of all pieces of cake. A valuation function v is a function that
maps each element of Σ to a non-negative real number such
that
• (Null empty set) v(∅) = 0;
• (Divisibility) For every interval [x, y] and every λ ∈
[0, 1], there is z ∈ [x, y] such that v([x, z]) = λ ·
v([x, y]);
• (Countably additive) For every sequence of disjoint in-
tervals {Ii}i∈N, we have v(
⋃
i∈N Ii) =
∑
i∈N v(Ii);
• (Normalized) v([0, 1]) = 1.
That is, ([0, 1],Σ, v) is a probability measure, and further-
more satisfies divisibility. These assumptions are standard
and widely used in cake-cutting settings.
For every number of agents n, an allocation A =
(A1, . . . , An) is a tuple of n disjoint pieces of cake whose
union is the whole cake. An instance is a tuple of n val-
uation functions v = (v1, . . . , vn), each corresponding to
the valuation function of an agent in N = {1, . . . , n}. We
say that an allocation A is envy-free (EF) for instance v if
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj) for all i, j ∈ N . More generally, we say
that an allocation A is δ-envy-free (δ-EF) for instance v if
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj) − δ for all i, j ∈ N . The social welfare of
an allocationA, denoted by SW(A), is simply∑i∈N vi(Ai).
The price of EF of an instance v, denoted by PoEF(v), is
the ratio between the maximum7 social welfare of an arbitrary
allocation and the maximum social welfare of an EF alloca-
tion. The price of EF for n agents, denoted by PoEFn, is the
supremum of the price of EF among all instances.
Given an instance v = (v1, . . . , vn) and an allocationA =
(A1, . . . , An), we define the valuation matrix M
v
A ∈ Rn×n
by (MvA)ij = vi(Aj). For a given instance v, a valuation
matrix and its corresponding allocation are essentially syn-
onymous; hence, we may use the previously defined notions
of envy-freeness and social welfare for the valuation matrices
as well.
For an instance v, denote byMv the set of valuation matri-
ces MvA over all possible allocations A. The following well-
known theorem from the cake-cutting literature will be useful
for us.
Theorem 7.2 ([Dubins and Spanier, 1961;
Dvoretzky et al., 1951]). For every instance v, Mv is
compact.
Let Mv,EF (resp. Mv,δ-EF) be the set of MvA over all
EF allocations A (resp. δ-EF allocations A). Observe that
Mv,EF (resp. Mv,δ-EF) is simply the intersection of Mv and
6In some prior works, each piece of cake is defined as a union of
finite disjoint intervals. We remark that Theorem 7.1 still holds un-
der this definition. Specifically, if we let M˜v denote the set of valua-
tion matrices defined under this (finite) definition, thenMv (defined
under our countable notion) is simply the closure of M˜v. The result
for the finite definition follows from this observation.
7Here we can use “maximum” instead of “supremum” due to the
compactness of the set of corresponding utility matrices; see Corol-
lary 7.3 below.
the set of all “EF valuation matrices” {M ∈ [0, 1]n×n |
∀i, j ∈ N,Mii ≥ Mij} (resp. “δ-EF valuation matrices”
{M ∈ [0, 1]n×n | ∀i, j ∈ N,Mii ≥ Mij − δ}). Since both
sets are compact, their intersection is also compact:
Corollary 7.3. For every instance v and every δ > 0,Mv,EF
andMv,δ-EF are compact.
7.2 A Useful Lemma
In this section, we will provide a lemma crucial to the proof
of Theorem 7.1. Informally speaking, the lemma states that,
as δ → 0, the welfare of an optimal δ-EF allocation is no
larger than that of an optimal EF allocation.
To make this formal, let us define additional notation: for
an instance v, let MaxSWEF(v) (resp. MaxSWδ-EF(v)) de-
note the maximum social welfare of an EF allocation (resp.
δ-EF allocation) of v. We can now state and prove the lemma:
Lemma 7.4. For every instance v, we have
limδ→0MaxSW
δ-EF(v) = MaxSWEF(v).
Proof. Let {δk}k∈N be any sequence of positive real num-
bers such that limk→∞ δk = 0. Clearly, MaxSWδk-EF(v) ≥
MaxSW
EF(v) for all k ∈ N. Hence, it suffices to show that
MaxSW
EF(v) ≥ limk→∞MaxSWδk-EF(v).
For every k ∈ N, let Mk denote the valuation matrix of
a δk-EF allocation with maximum social welfare for v. Con-
sider the sequence {Mk}k∈N. This is a sequence in a compact
setMv . Hence, it contains a subsequence {Mkℓ}ℓ∈N (where
k1 < k2 < . . . ) that has a limit M
∗ ∈ Mv. Hence, there
is an allocation that produces the valuation matrix M∗ for
v. We claim that (i) M∗ is envy-free, and (ii) SW(M∗) =
limk→∞MaxSWδk-EF(v). If (i) and (ii) hold, we have
MaxSW
EF(v) ≥ SW(M∗) = limk→∞MaxSWδk-EF(v) as
desired.
We now prove (i) and (ii), starting with the former. Let
β := maxi,j∈N (M∗ij −M∗ii) denote the “envy level” ofM∗,
i.e., M∗ is δ-EF iff β ≤ δ. (In particular, M∗ is envy-free
iff β = 0.) For every ℓ0 ∈ N, since M∗ = limℓ→∞Mkℓ
andMkℓ0 ,Mkℓ0+1 , · · · ∈ M
v,δk
ℓ0
-EF
, andMv,δkℓ0 -EF is com-
pact, we can conclude thatM∗ ∈ Mv,δkℓ0 -EF. In other words,
we have β ≤ δkℓ0 . Since this is true for every ℓ0 ∈ N and
limℓ→∞ δkℓ = 0, we must have β = 0, meaning that M
∗ is
envy-free.
Finally, we argue that (ii) holds. Since M∗ =
limℓ→∞Mkℓ , we have (M
∗)ij = limℓ→∞(Mkℓ)ij for all
i, j ∈ N . It follows that
SW(M∗) =
∑
i∈N
(M∗)ii
=
∑
i∈N
lim
ℓ→∞
(Mkℓ)ii
= lim
ℓ→∞
∑
i∈N
(Mkℓ)ii
= lim
ℓ→∞
SW(Mkℓ)
= lim
ℓ→∞
MaxSW
δk
ℓ
-EF(v)
= lim
k→∞
MaxSW
δk-EF(v),
which concludes the proof.
7.3 Proof of Theorem 7.1
We now proceed to prove our main theorem of this section
(Theorem 7.1).
Proof of Theorem 7.1. Fix the number of agents n. To prove
the lemma, it suffices to show that for every ǫ ∈ (0, 1], the
price of EF1 is at least the price of EF times 1− ǫ.
Fix ǫ > 0. Recall that PoEFn is defined as supv PoEF(v).
Thus, there exists an instance v = (v1, . . . , vn) such that
PoEF(v) ≥ (1 − ǫ/2) · PoEFn. This means that it suffices
to show that the price of EF1 is at least (1− ǫ/2) · PoEF(v).
Indeed, this will imply that the price of EF1 is bounded below
by (1− ǫ/2)2 · PoEFn ≥ (1− ǫ) · PoEFn.
To show this, we will create an instance I such that the
price of EF1 of I is at least (1 − ǫ/2) · PoEF(v). Before we
describe I , we need a few additional definitions:
• Let δ > 0 be such that MaxSWδ-EF(v) ≤
MaxSW
EF(v) + ǫ/4. This δ exists due to Lemma 7.4.
• Let A = (A1, . . . , An) denote an optimal allocation for
instance v. Recall that each Ai is a countable union of
intervals; this means that there exists a finite union of
intervals A˜i ⊆ Ai such that vi(A˜i) ≥ vi(Ai)− ǫ4n .
• For every i ∈ N , let 0 ≤ pi1 ≤ · · · ≤ pi⌊1/δ⌋ ≤ 1 be such
that ui([0, p
i
1]), ui([p
i
1, p
i
2]), . . . , ui([p
i
⌊1/δ⌋, 1]) are less
than δ. These points exist due to the divisibility of vi.
Let 0 = s1 < · · · < sq = 1 denote all of the end-
points in A˜1, . . . , A˜n together with
⋃
i∈N{pi1, . . . , pi⌊1/δ⌋}.
Our instance I contains q − 1 indivisible items. For each
j = 1, . . . , q− 1, good j is constructed so that it is equivalent
to the piece [sj , sj+1] in the cake, i.e., ui(j) = vi([sj , sj+1])
for every agent i. We now show that the price of EF1 of I is
at least (1− ǫ/2) · PoEF(v).
We start by proving that OPT(I) ≥ OPT(v) − ǫ/4. The
reason is simple: we can allocate all intervals in A˜i to each
i because their endpoints are in {s1, . . . , sq}. (The remain-
ing goods can be assigned arbitrarily.) This allocation yields
social welfare at least∑
i∈N
ui(A˜i) ≥
∑
i∈N
(
ui(Ai)− ǫ
4n
)
= SW(A)− ǫ/4
= OPT(v)− ǫ/4.
Next, we argue that any EF1 allocation of I has social wel-
fare at mostMaxSW
EF(v) + ǫ/4. To see this, let us consider
any EF1 allocation of I . Since we include pi1, . . . , p
i
⌊1/δ⌋
to the set of endpoints, agent i values each good at most δ.
Hence, since the allocation is EF1, each agent i’s value for
her bundle is at least her value for any other bundle minus
δ. In other words, the corresponding allocation of the cake
is δ-EF. Hence, the social welfare of the allocation is at most
MaxSW
δ-EF(v), which is in turn at mostMaxSWEF(v)+ ǫ/4
from our choice of δ.
As a result, the price of EF1 for I is at least
OPT(v) − ǫ/4
MaxSW
EF(v) + ǫ/4
≥ (1− ǫ/4) · OPT(v)
(1 + ǫ/4) ·MaxSWEF(v)
≥ (1− ǫ/2) · PoEF(v),
which concludes our proof. Note here that the first inequality
follows from the fact that both OPT(v) and MaxSWEF(v)
are always at least 1.
8 Discussion
In this paper, we study the price of fairness for indivisible
goods using several fairness notions that can always be satis-
fied. For most cases, we exhibit tight or asymptotically tight
bounds on the worst-case efficiency loss that can occur due to
fairness constraints. Interestingly, both the round-robin and
MNW allocations, which are EF1, can have social welfare a
linear factor away from the optimum, but not worse. In future
research, it would be useful to close the gaps that remain af-
ter this work, the most intriguing of which is perhaps the EF1
gap between Ω(
√
n) and O(n). As we mentioned, settling
this question would also have consequences on the price of
envy-freeness gap in the divisible goods setting left open by
Caragiannis et al. [2012].
Another direction for future work is to study the price of
fairness for the chore division problem, where chores refer to
items that yield negative utility for the agents. Indeed, almost
all of the notions that we consider in the goods setting have
direct analogs in the chore setting, and it would be interesting
to see whether the corresponding bounds in the two settings
turn out to be similar as well.
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